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In the past decades, there has been a rapid increase of
interdisciplinary research with regard to law, exempli-
fied in socio-legal research and law and economics.
More recently, there has also been – albeit in some
countries more than in others – a growing interest in the
methodology of legal research. This special issue com-
bines those two trends. It focuses on a crucial obstacle in
integrating interdisciplinary research and traditional
legal research. It is the question how we can incorporate
other disciplines and their findings into legal doctrinal
research.
Traditionally, the methods of legal research are largely
identical to those of legal practitioners, especially judg-
es.1 Basically, these methods are hermeneutic or inter-
pretive; legal scholars collect legal sources (especially
legislation and court cases), interpret the texts, analyse
and address apparent contradictions and gaps, and con-
struct a coherent legal doctrine. This systematic
description of positive law may be called legal doctrinal
research in a narrow sense. However, most legal scholars
go beyond mere reconstruction, and include two addi-
tional aims in what may be called doctrinal research in a
broad sense: critical evaluation and recommendations
for law reform.2 Some scholars base their critical evalua-
tion and suggestions for reform merely on criteria of
internal coherence (for example, does a decision by a
court or a legislator fit in the general legal doctrine? does
it conform to the fundamental legal principles implicit
in that doctrine?). Others also appeal to substantive
moral principles, whereas researchers with an interest in
social sciences may point to deficiencies in efficiency,
effectiveness, or popular legitimacy.
From the perspective of the empirical and natural scien-
ces, the – largely implicit – methods used in doctrinal
research may seem highly questionable.3 The selection
and interpretation of court cases and other legal sources
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ciplinary Research into Law (2011) 33-52, Mohr Siebeck.
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seem arbitrary, an impression that is only reinforced by
the controversies that often exist concerning the correct
interpretation. It is a well-known criticism of judicial
reasoning that it is often based on implicit ideological or
political preferences, on naïve or distorted views of
social reality and human psychology, or on mere subjec-
tive and intuitive reasoning. This type of criticism
could, mutatis mutandis, be extended to traditional doc-
trinal research. There are usually no hypotheses that can
be tested, and there is nothing resembling the rigorous
methodologies that are common in certain other disci-
plines. The methods used for critical evaluation and for
suggesting reforms may seem even more subjective,
partly because the normative criteria used are often
implicit and inconclusive. As the analysis is usually
restricted to one legal order at a specific moment in its
historical development, it does not yield generalisable
results, let alone general theories. Moreover, for study-
ing law in the complex multilevel legal orders resulting
from European integration and globalisation, we need a
methods discussion with a European rather than a
national focus.4 It has also been questioned whether
legal research leads to an accumulation of legal knowl-
edge.5 Consequently, some even doubt whether law
deserves to be called an academic discipline at all.6 Even
though a negative answer would be too radical, we must
acknowledge that there is a serious methodological defi-
cit, as there are no well-developed, rigorous methods for
doctrinal research.
During the past century, partly in response to these and
similar criticisms, many researchers have turned to
interdisciplinary studies – also known as ‘interdisciplines’
– especially the various ‘law and…’ movements. Law &
society, law & economics, and law & literature are
among the most widespread. Some of these approaches
apply robust methods used by social sciences like eco-
nomics. Others, especially interdisciplines twinned with
hermeneutical disciplines such as literature studies and
ethics, often seem to suffer from methodological deficits
4. M. Hesselink, ‘A European Legal Method? On European Private Law
and Scientific Method’, European Law Journal 20-45 (2009).
5. G. Samuel, ‘Is Legal Knowledge Cumulative?’, Legal Studies 448-79
(2012).
6. Cf., C. Stolker, ‘“Ja geleerd zijn jullie wel!” Over de status van de
rechtswetenschap’, Nederlands Juristenblad 1409-1418 (2002);
C. Stolker, Rethinking the Law School. Education, Research, Outreach
and Governance (2014), Cambridge University Press.
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similar to those of law itself. Most of these interdisci-
plines are interested in issues other than legal doctrine,
such as the efficiency of legal rules or the degree of pop-
ular legitimacy. Thus, they do not provide answers to
the doctrinal questions that are central to traditional
legal research. As a result, they cannot provide a substi-
tute for doctrinal analysis, even though they may pro-
vide valuable knowledge about law.
1 Towards Interdisciplinary
Doctrinal Research
We suggest that this opposition between legal doctrinal
analysis and interdisciplinary research must be tran-
scended. The two must be integrated into what may be
called interdisciplinary doctrinal research. To some read-
ers, it may seem that an unbridgeable separation
between doctrinal analysis and interdisciplinary research
makes such integration impossible. However, we should
not exaggerate the differences.7
First, there is no such thing as purely monodisciplinary
doctrinal analysis. To study and interpret legal materi-
als, researchers have to rely on history and linguistics.
To deal with apparent contradictions, they need to
apply logic, argumentation theory, and philosophy. To
understand the purpose of legal regulations, they must
understand the society in which law is embedded, and
the human behaviour it attempts to regulate. This
means that they need to incorporate behavioural disci-
plines such as economics, sociology, and psychology.
Finally, as Dworkin has convincingly argued, in order to
construct legal doctrine in its best light, legal analysis
must incorporate moral and political philosophy.
Legal practitioners usually rely on a common-sense
understanding of each of these disciplines, and for many
practical purposes this may suffice.8 Nevertheless, this
reliance on common sense has come under severe criti-
cism in recent years,9 and it has contributed to judicial
failures in cases such as Lucia de B. in the Netherlands.
(In this case, a crucial mistake was a result of the court
misunderstanding statistics.) For academic research,
such a common-sense understanding of other disci-
plines is certainly not enough. Even for doctrinal analy-
sis in the narrow sense, we need an interdisciplinary
approach. For doctrinal analysis in the broad sense,
including critical evaluation and recommendations for
reform, the inclusion of interdisciplinary research is
clearly inevitable. Adequate critical evaluation and
advocacy for reform require at least some critical dis-
tance regarding the legal order, and the inclusion of
insights from, for instance, political philosophy, legal
7. D.W. Vick, ‘Interdisciplinarity and the Discipline of Law’, Journal of Law
and Society 163-93 (2004).
8. M. MacCrimmon, ‘What Is Common about Common Sense?: Caution-
ary Tales for Travelers Crossing Disciplinary Boundaries’, Cardozo Law
Review 1433-1460 (2001).
9. H. Crombagh, P. van Koppen & W.A. Wagenaar (eds.), Dubieuze za'-
ken. De psychologie van strafrechtelijk bewijs (2005), Olympus.
sociology, or economics. In short, legal doctrinal
research cannot be other than interdisciplinary by
nature.10
Second, the notion that interdisciplinary research does
not involve doctrine does not do justice to reality. Pure-
ly empirical studies may not include the reconstruction
of legal doctrine, but they often do result in critical eval-
uation and recommendations for reform. Many
researchers conducting interdisciplinary studies try to
translate their findings in ways that are relevant for doc-
trinal research. In empirical interdisciplines, examples
can be found in what is now often called socio-legal
studies11 and in law & economics.12 Some Dutch
researchers have even advocated a new interdiscipline
combining private law and behavioural sciences, called
‘civilology’.13 In hermeneutical interdisciplines such as
legal and political philosophy and legal history, similar
attempts to translate findings into doctrinal analysis
have always been present: for instance, in historical
jurisprudence (authors such as Maine and Savigny) and
in legal philosophy (authors such as Bentham and
Alexy).
Nevertheless, an important disadvantage of these inter-
disciplines is that their partially external perspective of
law is not easily translated, or easily incorporated, into
the internal perspective of doctrinal analysis. Therefore,
they cannot provide answers to the question as to how
legal doctrine should be systematically reconstructed,
nor do they provide more than prima facie arguments for
critical evaluation and reform. For example, law & eco-
nomics may show that a certain statute is inefficient, and
political philosophy may show that it is unjust. Yet,
these are only prima facie arguments for criticisms, as
there may be countervailing reasons of – for example –
coherence or popular legitimacy to keep the statute in
the books.14
2 Methodological Obstacles
It is an open question as to what extent this integration
will prove possible. Disciplines differ in many ways and
everyone who has ever done interdisciplinary research
knows that there are many obstacles. A discipline has
not only distinct methods and different objects of
research but also a different conceptual framework.15
Words like institution, rule, justice, or even law, have
different meanings in different disciplines. An example
10. Cf., K.M. Sullivan, ‘Foreword: Interdisciplinarity’, Michigan Law Review
1217-1226 (2007).
11. R. Banakar and M. Travers (eds.), Theory and Method in Socio-Legal
Research (2005), Hart; R. Cotterrell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas Be Inter-
preted Sociologically?’, Journal of Law and Society 171-92 (1998).
12. R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2010), Aspen.
13. W. van Boom, I. Giessen & M. Smit (eds.), Civilologie: opstellen over
empirie en privaatrecht (2012), Boom Juridische uitgevers.
14. J.B. White, ‘Establishing Relations between Law and Other Forms of
Thought and Language’, Erasmus Law Review 3-22 (2008).
15. J.B. White, Justice as Translation. An Essay in Cultural and Legal Criti-
cism (1990), Chicago.
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is provided by Den Hartogh.16 In Dutch law since 2004,
the word ‘euthanasia’ has had a very specific meaning,
which does not include medically indicated actions of
pain relief that, as a side effect, may shorten the life of
the patient (this is regarded as normal palliative care). A
large scale research project into the occurrence of eutha-
nasia repeated every five year since 1990 uses a slightly
broader definition, which includes this category if the
doctor explicitly intended to hasten the death of the
patient. As a result, according to Den Hartogh, the
empirical findings cannot really be used to evaluate the
results of the law, because it does not provide informa-
tion about euthanasia in the legal sense. Here translation
is not possible, let alone incorporation.
On the one hand, for hermeneutical disciplines like his-
tory and philosophy, integration may be easier than for
the abstract rational choice models of economics. On the
other hand, economics seems to have the most rigorous
methodologies, but may be less easy to translate and
integrate. Therefore, we must investigate in which
respects integration is possible and assess the barriers to
a full integration. What we need, therefore, is a meth-
odological framework for interdisciplinary doctrinal
research.
Of course, in this special issue, we cannot address such a
broad theme. We will focus on one central problem,
namely that of interdisciplinary incorporation. How can
we translate and incorporate the various non-legal disci-
plines and their findings into the language of legal doc-
trine?
We focus on this problem for two reasons. The first rea-
son is obviously, that it is important for the various
interdisciplines as such to understand and solve this
problem. Researchers often do engage in socio-legal
research or law and economics in order to come up with
normative recommendations on how to improve the law,
for example, by introducing new statutes or modifying
or abolishing existing ones. Nowadays, many research
projects are funded by government agencies with the
express request to evaluate the law and formulate rec-
ommendations for reform. If they want to do so they
need to know how to translate their empirical findings
and incorporate them in legally relevant and valid argu-
ments. Too often, we can find in such studies that there
is a substantial gap between empirical findings and nor-
mative recommendations.
The second reason is Sullivan’s observations that legal
doctrinal research itself is interdisciplinary.17 Therefore,
it must build on the methods of other disciplines and
incorporate some of these methods. Methods of political
philosophy and history are part of the methods of legal
research. That means that the methodological deficit in
doctrinal research may be partly overcome by explicitly
including those methods in legal research. So far, one
strategy to address the methodological deficit has been
16. G. den Hartogh, ‘De definitie van euthanasie in het onderzoek naar
medische beslissingen bij het levenseinde’, Nederlands Juristenblad
798-805 (2013).
17. K.M. Sullivan, ‘Foreword: Interdisciplinarity’, Michigan Law Review
1217-1226 (2007).
to emphasise the autonomy of law and the distinctive
character of legal research. Our strategy can be regarded
as the opposite: the legal discipline may be distinctive
not because of its autonomy but because of its inclusive
interdisciplinarity. Therefore, we must address the
incorporation problem for the sake of legal research.
A difficulty is that different ways exist to combine legal
research with other disciplines. There are different pur-
poses that interdisciplinary research is meant to serve,
and a distinction can be made between five of them.18
The first one is that of heuristics, where the second disci-
pline is used merely to stimulate creativity and to obtain
new ideas. A second type involves using a second disci-
pline as an auxiliary discipline to provide data and input,
for example sociological insights about effectiveness or
economic insights about efficiency. A third type is that
of interdisciplinary comparative research involving two
parallel but separate projects – for example, a legal and
an ethical one – on the same issue, with parallel ques-
tions and methods; this makes a comparison at the end
possible. The fourth type is dialectical cooperation, in
which two separate disciplinary projects interact
throughout the research process, enabling researchers to
continuously adjust and refine their research. The fifth
type – and the most ambitious – is integrated research.
In the case of interdisciplinary doctrinal research, the
ultimate aim is that of integrated research from the
encompassing perspective of doctrinal research: namely,
constructing, evaluating, and reforming legal doctrine.
This does not mean, however, that legal doctrinal
research always has to be so extremely demanding; for
smaller research projects, usually the less ambitious
types are sufficient. For example, often all we need from
the other discipline are certain specific facts or general
insights into human behaviour; if that is what is needed,
we may settle for the second type of research: the appeal
to an auxiliary discipline. As each of these types brings
with it different methodological requirements, it is
important for researchers to determine precisely why
they want to include other disciplines in their projects.
3 This Issue
For this special issue of the Erasmus Law Review, we
have invited the contributors to reflect on the central
problem mentioned above, namely that of interdiscipli-
nary incorporation. The common research question to
be answered is thus: How can we translate and incorpo-
rate the various non-legal disciplines and their findings
into the language of legal doctrine? What are the differ-
ences and commonalities in conceptual frameworks and
18. W. van der Burg, ‘Law and Ethics: The Twin Disciplines’, in B. van Klink
and S. Taekema (eds.), Law and Method: Interdisciplinary Research
into Law (2011), at 175-94, Mohr Siebeck; largely followed by S. Tae-
kema and B. van Klink, ‘On the Border. Limits and Possibilities of Inter-
disciplinary Research’, in B. van Klink and S. Taekema (eds.), Law and
Method: Interdisciplinary Research into Law (2011) at 7-32, Mohr Sie-
beck; for a different distinction, see M. Siems, ‘Legal Originality’,
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 147-64 (2008).
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the methods between the discipline and legal research?
What are the central conceptual and methodological
stumbling blocks? How can we translate and incorporate
these (inter)disciplines? Is it merely incorporating the
results and insights or can we include the methods as
well into interdisciplinary doctrinal research?
This double issue of consists of two parts. A number of
case studies will appear in the next issue. We have asked
the contributors to that issue to illuminate these general
questions with their own experiences with interdiscipli-
nary research. The present issue focuses on a more the-
oretical analysis of these questions, although this does
certainly not exclude that the contributors also illustrate
their arguments with concrete experiences from their
own research. We will shortly introduce each of the
three essays in this volume.
Obviously, before we can analyse how other disciplines
can be integrated into doctrinal research, we must know
what doctrinal research entails, and why it may – or may
not – be deemed necessary to include other disciplines
or insights derived from those disciplines. Matyas Bodig
provides an introduction to these questions. He charac-
terizes legal scholarship as a normative and interpretive
discipline that offers an internalist and non-instrumen-
talist perspective on law. Interdisciplinary engagement
is sometimes necessary for legal scholars because some
concepts and ideas built into the doctrinal structures of
law cannot be made fully intelligible by way of pure nor-
mative legal analysis.
Theunis Roux engages in a critical discussion with some
of the theses put forward in this introduction. He argues
that the seriousness of the incorporation problem in
interdisciplinary legal research depends on how legal
research is understood. If legal research is understood as
a single, inherently interdisciplinary discipline, he sug-
gests that the problem largely falls away. If, on the other
hand, legal research is best conceived as a multi-discipli-
nary field, consisting of a core discipline – doctrinal
research – and various other types of mono-disciplinary
and interdisciplinary research, the incorporation of oth-
er disciplines presents real difficulties. These difficulties
are further explored and illustrated in the article.
The debate on legal methodology and the use of insights
from other disciplines can profit from similar debates
that since a long time have been going on in the field of
comparative law. Elaine Mak takes up this issue. Her
article studies the significance of insights from non-legal
disciplines (such as political science, economics and
sociology) for comparative legal research and the meth-
odology connected with such ‘interdisciplinary contex-
tualisation’. Based on a theoretical analysis concerning
the nature and methodology of comparative law, the
article demonstrates that contextualisation of the analy-
sis of legal rules and case law is required for a meaning-
ful comparison between legal systems.
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